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Was it to slow Iran’s ballistic missile program? U.S. intelligence assesses that Iran is years away from any .

Was it to show support for Iran’s opposition, as Trump’s earlier “HELP IS ON ITS WAY� suggested? A bombing campaign that was bound to kill innocent Iranians, including near a military base, seemed an odd form of support.

and former practitioner of intelligence and national security policy in the White House. I believe there are lessons in effecting political change in Iran that can be taken, ironically, from the very U.S.- and British-led clandestine campaign in the mid-20th century that set Iran on the road to the intense anti-Western and anti-American sentiment that has characterized its government policy for decades.

How does this end?

President Trump has said he wants but has articulated no strategy for achieving that end.

Strategy is the connection between means and ends. For waging a war, it means asking whether the military means available match the desired military outcome. In trying to effect political change, it means asking whether the instruments employed will produce the desired change.

As , “‘Bomb and hope’ is not a strategy.�

Looking at the last U.S. effort at regime change in Iran – the to oust and strengthen – … and what still might be this time around in Iran.

Mossadegh had moved to nationalize – effectively, British oil interests. Britain responded with an and a severe economic squeeze on Iran.

Western powers feared that prolonged Iranian instability could open the door to – a central Cold War concern.

By early 1953 the U.S. government, under President Dwight D. Eisenhower, to remove Mossadegh and restore effective power to the shah, who at the time held a more ceremonial role. a similar agenda, and the two services collaborated on both the strategy and its implementation.

The operational details, especially those , paint a striking picture of a carefully planned that was successful, rather than a simple military invasion.

A far cry from ‘bomb and hope’

The British-American budget for the joint plan was . It was aimed at , and it sought to shape public perception and political support.

It was composed of three elements. First designed to discredit Mossadegh, portraying him as corrupt or sympathetic to communism. The propaganda also promoted fears of instability and communist infiltration.

Second, , agents staged “false flag� incidents – attacks attributed to communists, for example – to stoke fear and backlash against Mossadegh among religious and conservative groups.

Third, the coup planners attempted to engage and organizations to amplify anti-Mossadegh sentiment.

Shaping the crowds on Tehran’s streets proved critical to the operation. The CIA organized demonstrators to pose as pro-shah protesters, including paying individuals to chant slogans and confront Mossadegh supporters.

These orchestrated , when pro-shah forces and sympathetic leaders in the Iranian military – with CIA financial and logistical backing – seized key points of the country, confronted Mossadegh loyalists and helped topple his government. Estimates suggest around 200 to in the chaotic fighting in Tehran.

What might have been, and what might be

The Mossadegh coup occurred in a less transparent world. However – and regardless of how you feel about it – the coup suggests the value of having a strategy to accomplish political change and, beyond Israel, bringing allies along if possible.

So far, Trump has called for the Iranian military and the Revolutionary Guard to . But the Trump administration has provided no guidance on how to do so, or to whom to do so.

Surely, the administration should be able to devise a plan for potential political change in Iran. It has insight from the with Iran. Recent events suggest the extent of Israeli, if not American, penetration of Iran.

In 2018, for instance, broke into an Iranian facility and stole archives on Iran’s nuclear activities, stored on CDs.

In June 2025, deep inside Iran, in concert with airstrikes on Iranian missile and military infrastructure. Mossad reportedly established an and launched explosive drones to neutralize air defenses and missile launchers before the main attack.

The successful and his close associates in the latest round of airstrikes suggests the extent of likely Israeli monitoring of Iranian communications by Mossad and the CIA.

Crises tend to put pressure on governments to open communications channels, and the take from any successful eavesdropping might be passed to opposition groups to help them organize and avoid capture.

If Israel can smuggle explosive drones into Iran, it should be able to make and its kin available to enable the opposition to better – and more safely – organize.

It is late in the day to emulate the Mossadegh coup with information operations, and it is probably more difficult in an era of ubiquitous social media, not newspapers. But it’s not too late to try.

I believe those brave opposition elements in Iran, who have been killed by their government and bombed by the United States and Israel, deserve no less.

This article is republished from , a nonprofit, independent news organization bringing you facts and trustworthy analysis to help you make sense of our complex world. It was written by: ,

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Gregory F. Treverton does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.